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Abstract: In this paper, I propose an empirical test of the main prediction of the
theoretical literature on the firm as an incentive structure using data on the Italian
markets, where two types of co-operative banks co-exist together with stock
banks. I estimate a standard translog cost frontier and I derive cost efficiency
scores. Kruskall–Wallis tests indicate that mean efficiency scores are statistically
different among the three types of banks, providing empirical support to the
theoretical prediction that different organizations represent different incentive
structures. Moreover, co-operatives banks appear more efficient than stock banks.
These results are robust also after controlling for the size of banks and the quality
of their credit policies in a second-stage analysis. Hence, the efficiency gains
stemming from the presence of scale economies seem to be dominated by the
efficiency losses caused by the agency relationships within the bank in a more
complex organization.
1. Introduction
It is well known that in a Walrasian economy setting, competitive equilibrium
exhibits desirable properties from a social standpoint. Besides the absence of in-
efficiencies, stemming from the hypotheses of perfectly competitive and complete
markets, there are two other consequences almost neglected in the traditional
economic analysis. The first one is that the ownership of enterprises (i.e., the class
of stakeholders to whom firms’ property rights are assigned) is completely irrel-
evant in terms of economic efficiency (e.g., Dre`ze, 1976). In a world of complete
contracts like the Walrasian framework, whether workers or investors are the
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firms’ owners does not affect the efficiency of the optimal equilibrium allocation.
The second consequence, easily obtainable from the first one, is that howfirms are
financed does not impact on economic efficiency (the renowned Modigliani and
Miller theorem, 1958). In other words, since workers’ or investors’ ownership
produces no effects on efficiency, a worker-owned co-operative completely
financed with debt is indistinguishable – from an efficiency viewpoint – from
an investor-owned stock company completely financed with own capital.
The striking feature of this economywithout imperfections is that the existence
of different ‘contracts’ envisaged by the law is difficult to explain in terms of
economic efficiency. To put it starkly, suppose that the Walrasian model is a
good positive theory; thence, whether firms are organized in the form of a joint
stock company or a partnership (andwhether the joint stock company is investor-
owned and the partnership worker-owned) is totally irrelevant for the efficiency
properties of the equilibrium outcome. However, when one explicitly recognizes
contracts incompleteness and the existence of various forms of transaction costs,
previous conclusions dramatically change. According to the theoretical literature,
in a world where transaction costs exist, firms’ owners do affect the equilibrium
outcome, and ownership is regarded as one mean (among others) to provide
incentives to different stakeholders (e.g., Hansmann, 1988, 1996; Holmstrom
andMilgrom, 1994). The common idea underlying these contributions is that the
observed pattern of ownership (if we exclude explicit provisions and limitations
by the law) should be guided by economic principles of efficiency. Hence,
ownership should be assigned to the class of stakeholders that minimizes the
overall transaction costs involved in the nexus-of-contracts established by the
firm. From an empirical point of view, the observed pattern of ownership seems
indeed to be linked to the existence of different categories of transaction costs
(e.g., Hansmann, 1996, for US; Pittatore and Turati, 2000, for the Italian case).
The theoretical proposition implicit in the results provided by this literature
(Hansmann 1988, 1996; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994) is that different
‘contracts’ – by implying different owners of the firms – are characterized by
different levels of transactions costs; hence, firms are characterized by different
levels of economic efficiency. This theoretical proposition can be tested exploiting
the literature on production and cost frontiers estimation (e.g., Lovell, 1993, for
a survey). After estimating a common frontier for all the firms operating in a
certain industry, one can easily obtain average measures of economic inefficiency
characterizing each ‘contract’.
Given the availability of the relevant data and the presence of different
‘contracts’, an industry that can be particularly fruitful for this kind of analysis
is the banking industry. In Italy (but the situation is similar to other countries
as well; see, e.g., Fonteyne, 2007, on Europe, and Altunbas et al., 2001, for the
German banking industry) at least three different types of organizations operate
in the market: private commercial banks (stock banks), and two different types
of co-operative banks, namely the Banche Popolari and the Banche di Credito
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Cooperativo. The striking difference among the three groups is the class of
stakeholders to whom property rights are assigned. In Italy, these stakeholders
are respectively investors, workers, and borrowers. Besides the class of owners,
other differences among the three types of ‘contracts’ can be observed: for
instance in terms of the transaction costs for both depositors and borrowers,
of the ‘lending technology’, of the size and branching, and of the governance
structure. All these elements, in principle, can influence banks’ efficiency, and
can characterize each contract as a specific institution.
In this paper, I propose an empirical test of the theoretical prediction that
different ‘contracts’ are characterized by different levels of efficiency using data
on the Italian banking industry. After briefly reviewing the theoretical literature
and considering the transaction costs relevant for the different stakeholders,
I estimate a common cost frontier and compare average levels of inefficiency
among the three different groups of firms active in the Italian banking market.
The main result is that different ‘contracts’ are indeed characterized by different
levels of overall inefficiency, and this reflects a pure organizational effect (i.e.,
robust also after controlling for a size effect). Hence, the different ‘contracts’
designed by the law seem to be helpful in solving an economic efficiency problem,
providing economic agents different specific institutions.
The paper is linked to at least two different strands of literature. As it
represents an exercise to empirically assess the validity of the theoretical
approach that looks at firms as ‘incentive structures’, it falls within the
empirical research in transaction costs economics (e.g., Shelanski and Klein,
1995, and Masten, 2002, for a survey; Carter and Hodgson, 2006, for a critical
review). However, differently from the basic empirical model that considers the
organizational form as the dependent variable, here I estimate a cost frontier and
look at differences in the levels of inefficiency across different types of firms. The
basic idea is to consider inefficiency as a proxy measure for transaction costs
typifying each organization, and to show that different organizations are indeed
characterized by different levels of transactions costs.
As it is based on data about Italian banks and uses established methodologies
to measure efficiency, the paper is also related to the huge research on efficiency
and its determinants in banking. Berger and Mester (1997) provide a survey
of this literature, by concentrating on the different concepts of efficiency, the
different measurement techniques, and the potential correlates with efficiency
scores. This paper employs the cost efficiency concept and the parametric
approach to analyse the potential role of the organizational structure (mutual
versus stock) as a determinant of bank efficiency. The novelty within this
literature is the use of Italian data: similar exercises have been already provided,
for example, by Altunbas et al. (2001) using German data, and byMester (1993)
considering the US savings and loans industry.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I briefly
discuss the theoretical literature on the modern theory of the firm as an ‘incentive
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structure’ within the context of the banking industries, in order to define a
theoretical framework useful for the empirical analysis. Section 3 is devoted to
the empirical methodology and to data description, while Section 4 discusses the
results. Section 5 summarizes the main conclusions.
2. Theoretical background: social transaction costs in banking
I work here on the general theoretical approach proposed separately by
Hansmann (1988, 1996) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) that models
firms as ‘incentive structures’. The basic intuition of this theoretical approach
is that all stakeholders bear transaction costs when they relate to firms, both
through contracts as non-owners, and through ownerships’ rights when they
are the owners. Each firm in the economy can assume a number of different
organizational structures, by choosing among the different ‘contracts’ envisaged
by the law. An organizational structure is defined as an allocation of the firms’
property rights to a specific class of stakeholders sj. Since this allocation influences
the incentives of the remaining classes, we are in a world where – following
Holmstrom (1999) – there are ‘contractual externalities’, and the Coase theorem
applies.
The social transaction costs SC associated to a firm when the class sj is the
class of stakeholders to whom property rights have been assigned can be defined
as:
SCj = COj +
∑
i =j
CC
j
i (1)
where CO are the transaction costs associated to stakeholders sj for being the
owners of the firm (the costs of ownership), and CC are the transaction costs
faced by the remaining si = sj stakeholders for their contractual relations with
the firm (the costs of contracts) when the stakeholders sj are the owners.
There are different types of costs of contracts and costs of ownership, i.e.
different types of inefficiencies with respect to a frictionless world.1 Here I follow
Hansmann, who defines three main categories for both the costs of contracts
1 Before describing these two categories further, it is worth noting that each type has been separately
analysed by two different strands of research: the literature on the choice between markets and firms and
the literature on the internal organization of firms. The former is related to the presence of relationship-
specific investments in a contract between two parts, and it groups the transaction cost economics
approach and the property rights approach (see, e.g., Williamson, 2000, for a recent comparison of
the two approaches). The latter can be referred to the standard principal–agent framework, and to the
derived literature on the provision of incentives in organizations. It collects both a positive approach (e.g.,
Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b), and a normative approach (starting with Grossman and
Hart, 1983). Hence, by considering the social transaction costs, Hansmann (1988, 1996) and Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1994) put together these two strands of literature, and provide a unitary framework to
explain endogenously when it is socially efficient for a certain class of stakeholders to own a firm in a
certain industry.
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and the costs of ownership. The costs deriving from the existence of ex-ante
and ex-post market power and from the existence of asymmetric information
represent the main costs of contracts. The costs of controlling managers (in
all the firms where ownership and control are separated), the costs related
to collective decision making, and the costs stemming from risk bearing are
the main costs of ownership. Note that these are all categories of transaction
costs well known in the economic literature. For instance, the transaction
costs inherent in the existence of ex-ante market power simply resemble the
inefficiency related to monopoly and other non-competitive market structures,
namely higher prices and lower quantities for buyers with respect to the efficient
competitive equilibrium. The existence of asymmetric information brings about
transaction costs deriving from both adverse selection and moral hazard. The
costs of controlling managers are well represented by all the normative solutions
designed to solve the standard principal–agent problem, and to provide incentives
to agents operating inside a firm. The difference with the previous literature is
that all these transaction costs are now considered together in order to define the
social transaction costs for all the stakeholders (i.e., the sum of all inefficiencies
characterizing an organization).
When one moves from the general theoretical framework developed by
Hansmann to the banking industry, it must be recognized that a unified analysis
of the transaction costs related to each class of stakeholders of a bank is lacking.2
There are, of course, numerous contributions that study the transaction costs
(and the possible normative solutions) for depositors and borrowers, probably
the two most important classes of stakeholders when thinking of a bank.
Diamond (1984) is a common reference in this case. The author shows that –
given asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers – a financial
intermediary (i.e., an organization that collects funds from depositors and
lends these funds to entrepreneurs) has a cost advantage in monitoring and
enforcing a financial contract of debt with respect to direct lending. A financial
intermediary enjoys returns to scale in producing monitoring effort, and these
cost savings exceed the delegation costs (i.e., the transaction costs that sustain
depositors, who ‘delegate’ the bank to monitor on their behalf the contract with
the entrepreneur). An interesting point in Diamond’s analysis, not sufficiently
stressed in the literature, is that two different models of financial intermediary
are economically viable: ‘one model increases the number of agents working
together within the intermediary organization as the intermediary monitors a
larger number of entrepreneurs. The second model assumes that the intermediary
consists of a single agent who monitors a large number of entrepreneurs
2 An unintentional exception is represented by Cerasi and Daltung (2000). The authors extend
Diamond (1984) by assuming that a banker can monitor effectively only a finite number of investment
projects, somewhat considering the internal organization of the bank. However, they do not explore the
effects of different allocations of property rights on monitoring costs.
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with independent projects’ (see Diamond, 1984: 404). Even though Diamond
does not recognize this explicitly, it seems possible to relate the first type of
intermediary to the model of a co-operative bank, where the agents working
together within the organization are simply the borrowers. For instance, Banerjee
et al. (1994) refer to this model as an organizational structure characterized by
peer monitoring among the members of the co-operative.3 Notice that, in this
case, each borrower has the incentive to monitor fellow borrowers, providing –
in turn – higher incentives to repay the loan. In Hansmann’s terminology,
this ‘risk sharing’ model of a bank is that of an organization in which the
property rights are assigned to borrowers. On the contrary, the second model of
financial intermediary envisaged by Diamond is that of a typical stock bank, an
organization owned by investors.
The costs of contracts
Assigning ownership to a certain class of stakeholder changes the cost of
contracts for the remaining classes. Let us consider three different groups of
stakeholders: providers of external finance (depositors and other investors),
borrowers, and workers, which help identify the three patterns of ownership for
banks operating in the Italian markets (i.e., respectively, stock-banks, Banche
di Credito Cooperativo, and Banche Popolari). When depositors and other
providers of funds to be invested are not the owners, they clearly face costs
deriving both from the existence of market power and from the existence of
asymmetric information in the use of funds. The banking literature has focused
mainly on the second category, generally looking for normative solutions. For
example, Diamond (1984) proves that when depositors delegate monitoring to
a bank, the debt contract is the optimal contractual solution. Rajan (1998),
surveying the incomplete contract approach to banking, suggests that fractional
reserve banking was a second-best solution to protect depositors against
the misappropriation of funds from the banker. The introduction of deposit
insurance schemes displaced this organizational arrangement, as observed also
by Rasmusen (1988), who argues that assigning ownership to depositors is a
solution that helps explain the historical evidence on the evolution of banking in
the United States.
However, when depositors and other investors are the owners, they can
draw on an array of normative solutions (including monitoring) to partially
overcome problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. These solutions
include the request for collateral, the signalling power of the personal capital of
the entrepreneur directly invested in the project, and the borrower’s reputation.
3 For a more formal analysis of the peer monitoring mechanism, see, e.g., Armendariz and Murdoch
(2007) and the references therein. Notice that the mechanism is relevant for solving both adverse selection
and moral hazard problems that can arise within a bank. As for adverse selection, control by peers will
prevent ‘bad’ firms becoming owners. As for moral hazard, control by peers will prevent owners from
choosing ‘bad’ projects. Also, free-riding in controlling is curbed by this mechanism.
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Obviously, all these solutions are costly for borrowers; but one needs to
distinguish between two broad categories of borrowers, namely large firms and
small firms. These two categories are characterized by a different level of opacity
of the relevant information for the banker. In particular, while information
on large firms is usually available in the form of financial statements (the so-
called ‘hard’ information), information on small firms is not, and must be
gathered by the loan officer over the course of the relationship (the so-called
‘soft’ information). This enables large firms to collect funds also directly from
the market, whilst small firms are highly dependent on internal finance and bank
debt as a primary source of external finance (see, e.g., Berger and Udell, 2002);
hence, small firms bear a higher volume of transaction costs than large ones.
These transaction costs are higher also if one thinks of the other normative
solutions that can be used by investors and depositors to mitigate the problems
of asymmetric information: small firms do not typically have real assets to be
used as collateral, they are characterized by a lower level of capitalization,
and they lack reputation on traditional banking markets. In all these cases,
developing a relationship with a bank might represent a possibility for small
firms to obtain funds. However, Angelini et al. (1998) point out two different
theoretical effects stemming from developing such a relationship. On the one
hand, there is a virtuous effect on the price and the availability of credit,
since more information becomes accessible the longer is the relationship; this
contributes to decreased transaction costs for borrowers. On the other hand,
small firms become ‘informationally captured’, and the bank can exploit this
rent by worsening contractual conditions; this effect works in the direction of
increasing the transaction costs for borrowers.
The last category of stakeholders that can contract with a bank is that of
workers. However, cost of contracts seems to be relatively low for this group,
since it is reasonable to think of a competitive labour market also for bank
employees. On the contrary, workers are responsible for increasing costs of
ownership for the owners, a category of transaction costs to which now I turn.
The costs of ownership
Beside the costs of contracts, social transaction costs include the costs of
ownership. In this case, the most important differences arise between small local
banks and banks with a large network of branches, a typical discrepancy between
borrower-owned co-operative banks (like the Banche di Credito Cooperativo
in Italy), and stock banks. Of course, the larger the organization, the more
important the agency problems of controlling managers and workers, and of
delegating authority within the organization when the ownership is in the hands
of borrowers or investors. On the contrary, this argument loses some of its
power when ownership is assigned to workers, as in the original model of Banca
Popolare in Italy. However, following Hansmann, it is worth noting that if there
are substantial differences among workers’ tasks (and this is more likely the
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larger and more layered the bank), then the costs of collective decision making
could be increased. This is mostly important when banks are organized as co-
operatives, due to their particular governing structure (the voting mechanism
and the mechanisms for selecting new members that makes the choice highly
discretionary).4 Finally, as far as the managers are concerned, Rasmusen (1988)
recalls that assigning property rights to investors/depositors partially contributes
to solve agency problems, because managers have incentives to pursue a safe
investment policy in order to maintain their rents.5
The dimension of the bank influences not only the transaction costs arising
within the organization for the agency relationships, but also the ability of the
bank to collect, process, and use different kinds of information. In particular,
an argument put forward by Berger and Udell (2002) suggests that there
is an organizational diseconomy of scale in activities requiring the use of
‘soft’ information. Small banks reduce agency costs in the use of this kind
of information with their loan officers, by eliminating layers of management.
Moreover, the banks’ president usually has very tight links to the local
community, and this further helps mitigate the problems. On the contrary, large
banks alleviate the agency costs by reducing the amount of relationship lending,
hence reducing the delegation of authority within the organization. Indeed,
Berger et al. (2001) find empirical support for this argument, by showing that
large banks develop relationships that are more impersonal with their borrowers
than small banks.
The size and the organization of banks are relevant also in explaining
transaction costs related to collective decision making. While for investors, this
category of costs is relatively small compared to other transaction costs, it can
be very important for both workers and borrowers, especially when the group
of owners is characterized by heterogeneous preferences. This is likely to happen
in the presence of small and large borrowers, or of bank-tellers, bookkeepers,
and branch managers. In all these cases, heterogeneous preferences can lead to
inefficient decisions, and make the decision process really troublesome.
The social transaction costs
Before turning to the empirical part of the paper, I try now to put together
all these suggestions from the theoretical literature to find an explanation of
when the co-operative solution (and, in particular, the borrowers owned co-
operative) can constitute a socially efficient incentive structure for a bank (since
it minimizes the sum of all the inefficiencies related to the organization). Table 1
provides a structured map of transactions costs for different stakeholders in the
4 For all these reasons, the model of Banca Popolare has probably become inadequate in recent years,
and the governance structure needs to be redefined. Reforms, however, seems particularly difficult to
implement.
5 In light of the recent financial crisis, this argument needs at best to be profoundly re-evaluated.
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Table 1. Social transaction costs in banking for different allocations of property rights
Ownership assigned to:
Borrowers (Banca di
Credito Cooperativo)
Investors/depositors
(Societa` per Azioni)
Workers (Banca
Popolare)
Transaction costs for:
Borrowers Costs of ownership:
increase with size and
organizational layers,
both for collective
decision making and
agency costs
Costs of contracts:
relatively higher for
small firms than for
large firms, for
market power
(ex-ante and ex-post)
Costs of contracts:
relatively higher for
small firms than for
large firms, due to
market power
(ex-ante and ex-post)
Investors/depositors Costs of contracts: can
be high because of the
misappropriation of
funds by owners
Costs of ownership:
increase with size and
organizational layers,
both for agency costs
and diseconomies in
processing ‘soft’
information
Costs of contracts: can
be high because of the
misappropriation of
funds by owners
Workers Cost of contracts:
relatively small
because of
competitive labour
market
Cost of contracts:
relatively small
because of
competitive labour
market
Costs of ownership:
increase with size and
organizational layers,
both for collective
decision making and
diseconomies in
processing ‘soft’
information
presence of three different types of banks: a borrower-owned co-operative bank
(i.e., the Banca di Credito Cooperativo in Italy), an investor-owned bank (i.e.,
a stock bank, or Societa` per Azioni), and a worker-owned credit co-operative
(i.e., the Banca Popolare). Several considerations emerge from observing this
map. First, transaction costs characterizing the three organizations are different;
hence, the efficiency losses characterizing each organization are different. Second,
by looking at the costs of ownership, assigning property rights to workers and
borrowers is less likely the more layered is the organization, because of higher
transaction costs related to collective decision making. On the contrary, the
costs of ownership are problematic for investors because of agency costs, and
the diseconomies in processing ‘soft’ information when the bank’s size increases.
Third, turning to the costs of contracts, these are usually small for workers,
making their ownership almost always an inefficient solution in banking. On
the contrary, considering borrowers, these costs can be extremely high for small
firms, because of the need to process ‘soft’ information. And the same is true for
investors/depositors, because of the possible misappropriation of funds by the
owners.
552 GILBERTO TURATI
When then are borrower-owned credit co-operatives an efficient institutional
arrangement? In terms of transaction costs for investors, the literature suggests
that small business lending is the most costly activity for banks, due to the need
of collecting ‘soft’ information. The co-operative contract limits these costs by
assigning ownership to borrowers, and favouring the peer monitoring among co-
operative members. Given the need to collect ‘soft’ information, the organization
must be small and locally based: this is guaranteed by the particular governing
structure envisaged by the law, in particular by the voting mechanism and the
process of selecting new members. Hence, from a theoretical point of view,
the co-operative contract seems to define an optimal incentive structure for a
lending activity based on ‘soft’ information among peers. Whether the volume
of social transaction costs involving the co-operative contract is higher than that
characterizing stock ownership is, however, not possible to define a priori. In
the empirical part of the paper, to which now I turn, I provide a measure of
social transaction costs by exploiting the literature on cost frontier estimation,
and test:
(a) whether the three types of banks are characterized by different levels of social
transaction costs (i.e., of economic efficiency);
(b) which of the three types is characterized by the lower level of social transaction
costs.
3. The empirical analysis
The methodology
To empirically assess whether the co-operative bank really constitutes a different
incentive structure with respect to the stock bank, and is characterized by a lower
level of efficiency losses, I exploit the literature on frontiers estimation (e.g.,
Lovell, 1993, for a survey). Since the basic test is whether the two ‘contracts’ are
characterized by different levels of efficiency (hypothesis (a) above), I estimate
a common frontier and compare the average levels of efficiency characterizing
the types of banks operating in the Italian market. I assume that banks have
access to a common stochastic technology in the production of banking services,
represented by the following ‘extended’ production set:
y = f (x, SCj , ε) (2)
where y and x represent respectively the vector of outputs and the vector of
inputs; SCj are the social transaction costs related to the organization when
property rights are assigned to the class of stakeholders sj;6 ε represents pure
random noise that picks up the impact of variables outside the control of the firm
(plus potential measurement errors that could plague the data). This approach
6 See equation (1) above. It is worth noting that in the terminology of frontiers estimation, this is the
term representing inefficiency.
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resembles Jensen andMeckling (1979), who argue that ‘the maximum attainable
output of a firm is . . . not purely a matter of ‘physical’ possibilities given the
technology and knowledge; the production function depends on the contracting
and property-rights system within which the firm operates’.
In the empirical analysis of the banking industry, it is often argued that a
common frontier approach is misleading, because it can cause the researchers to
confuse technological differences with inefficiency. However, as the theoretical
discussion on the firm as an incentive system should have made clear,
organizational differences reflect choice variables of banking firms, and not
differences in the production set. In other words, this means that having access to
a common ‘extended’ production set, each bank chooses the ownership structure
and the organizational structure (that together define its objective function),
beyond inputs and outputs of the production process.7 A similar argument is
made by Altunbas et al. (2001); they state that ‘if a priori all firms are faced with
the same opportunities to combine labor, physical capital and financial capital
to produce outputs that are virtually identical, then the adoption of a technology
that results in higher costs or lower profits is the result of a management choice’.
Here I model the banking production process described by equation
(2) following the so-called ‘intermediation approach’ proposed by Sealey
and Lindley (1977). I assume that banks use labour (L), physical capital (K),
and deposits (D) as inputs in order to produce three outputs: loans (LO) and
investments in securities (OEA) that together define the traditional activity of
banks, plus financial services for customers (SER), as part of the innovative
activity of commercial banks.
From the production function represented in equation (2), it is easy to derive
the associated cost frontier:
c = f (y,w, SCj , ε) (3)
wherew represents the input price vector and the remaining variables are defined
as before. Besides the hypothesis of a common production set, concentrating on
a common cost frontier requires that the objective function of all the types
7 Cummins et al. (1999) test – using cross-frontier analysis – whether stock and mutual insurers are
characterized by a different technology in producing insurance. They define technology ‘as including the
contractual relationships that constitute the firm as well as physical technology choices’. They conclude
that ‘stocks andmutuals are using different technologies and that the stock (mutual) technology is superior
on average to the mutual (stock) technology for producing the stock (mutual) firms’ output vector’.
However, considering the theoretical framework presented here, estimated differences by Cummins
et al. simply reflect the presence of inefficiencies in the choice of ownership structure. For instance,
some allocations may be unattainable for stock firms, because ownership has been inefficiently obtained
by investors. In other words, the ‘extended’ production (and cost) function considered here describes
the technology available to all stakeholder classes before ownership has been assigned. Notice that the
organizational structure, like every input and output, can be chosen each year. Indeed, in Italy also some
banks are changing their co-operative nature and adopting the stock contract when increasing their branch
network.
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of banks operating in the industry incorporate total cost minimization. While
this is commonly accepted as true for stock banks (even though the separation
between ownership and control can make the objectives of managers diverge
from those of the owners), it is sometimes questioned in the literature for co-
operative banks. An argument frequently mentioned is that while market forces
are expected to discipline managers who run stock banks to minimize costs, the
same does not apply to managers of co-operative banks. However, this does
not need to be true, and other mechanisms (for instance, reputation) can be at
work in a co-operative bank to discipline managers that usually share special
connections with the local community. Moreover, as also Altunbas et al. (2001)
note, ‘competition between banks is likely to emphasize cost minimization as
an important managerial objective’; and competition intensified in the Italian
banking markets during the 1990s.
I specify equation (3) as a standard translog cost frontier. The specification to
be estimated can then be written as:
ln c = β0 +
3∑
i=1
βi lnwi +
3∑
j=1
αj ln yj
+ 1/2
3∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
βij lnwi lnwj+1/2
3∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
αij ln yi ln yj
+
3∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
γij ln yi lnwj + η (4)
where the input price vector is w = [wL, wK, wD], the output vector is y = [LO,
OEA, SER], and η is a composed error term that includes both inefficiency (the
social transaction costs) and pure random noise. Homogeneity of degree one in
prices requires the following restrictions on the parameters of the cost function:
3∑
i=1
βi = 1;
3∑
i=1
βij = 0, ∀j ;
3∑
i=1
γij = 0, ∀i (5)
whereas equality of cross partial derivatives entails αij = αji and β ij = β ji. As is
usual in the literature, I impose both sets of restrictions in equation (4).
From equation (4), one can also derive indicators for scale and scope
economies. In particular, returns to scale characterizing production can be
obtained by considering global elasticity of size:
ξ =
(
3∑
i=1
∂ ln c
∂ ln yi
)−1
(6)
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ξ > 1 (ξ < 1) implies that the bank is operating under increasing (decreasing)
returns to scale; hence, the optimal production scale can be obtained by
increasing (decreasing) the volume of funds intermediated.
Scope economies between output yi and yj can instead be measured by
considering the definition of cost complementarities (in this sense, e.g., Ferrier
and Lovell, 1990):
ζ = ∂
2 ln c
∂ ln yi∂ ln yj
+
(
∂ ln c
∂ ln yi
× ∂ ln c
∂ ln yj
)
(7)
Scope economies (diseconomies) between output yi and yj exist whenever ζ < 0
(ζ > 0).
The data
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of more than 700 Italian banks in
1999. Data are obtained from the BilBank 2000 database managed by the Italian
Association of Banks (Associazione Bancaria Italiana). It includes banks’ balance
sheet information on three different types of banks, namely stock banks (Societa`
per Azioni, SPA), and two types of co-operatives (Banche Popolari, POP, and
Banche di Credito Cooperativo, BCC). The final sample includes 175 SPA, 39
POP, and 495 BCC; this reproduces pretty well the presence of each type of
bank in the Italian markets.
The three types of banks are characterized by different contracts regulated in
the Italian Civil Code. This, in turn, implies other differences, for instance with
respect to the group of stakeholders who own the firm, size, and balance sheet
structure. As for the group of stakeholders who own property rights, as already
mentioned above, the literature usually recognizes that SPA are investor-owned
firms, POP are worker-owned co-operatives, and BCC are borrower-owned co-
operatives. Notice that these ownership structures are sustained also by the
particular governing mechanisms envisaged by the law. In the typical stock
bank, every share carries one vote; but, in the typical co-operative contract,
every member has one vote. This reflects also the historical roots of the co-
operative movement, discussed for instance by Fonteyne (2007), to help solve
a number of market imperfections. However, an important distinction has to
be made between the two types of co-operatives operating in Italy: while BCC
maintained their mutual nature, the latest regulation on POP strongly mitigated
their mutualistic aim. On the one hand, as Presti (1998) puts it, the Italian
Banking Law (T.U. Bancario) does not prescribe the mutualistic aim for the
Banche Popolari, and does not stress those rules that are normally used in the
general law either to favour it or to compress the lucrative aim. On the other
hand, the mutual nature of BCC is emphasized by two provisions: (a) loans
must be granted mostly (even if not only) to members (which makes the BCC a
contractual arrangement very close to the theoretical model of an organization
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Table 2a. Descriptive statistics (mean values, 1999)
All BCC POP SPA
Total assets (bn It. lire) 3, 850.280 259.284 7, 787.622 13, 130.205
Physical capital (% total assets (T.A)) 2.4 1.9 1.8 3.7
Loans (% T.A.) 61.8 60 67.7 65.6
Other earning assets (% T.A.) 11.2 10.1 14.4 13.5
Deposits (% T.A.) 58.1 57.7 59.7 58.9
Managed securities (% T.A.) 84.8 75.7 86.6 110.6
Bad loans (% loans) 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.6
Nr. banks 709 495 39 175
Note: BCC = borrower-owned cooperative; POP = worker-owned cooperative; SPA = investor-owned
bank.
Source: our calculations on BilBank data.
Table 2b. Descriptive statistics (mean values, 1999)
Belonging to a group
All Independent Head Subsidiary
Total assets (bn It. lire) 3, 850.280 404.320 20, 113.176 12, 475.66
Physical capital (% total assets (T.A.)) 2.4 1.9 4.5 3.3
Loans (% T.A.) 61.8 60.7 62.7 67.5
Other earning assets (% T.A.) 11.2 10.4 14.5 13.4
Deposits (% T.A.) 58.1 58.1 57.4 58.4
Managed securities (% T.A.) 84.8 79.1 106.3 99.2
Bad loans (% loans) 3.8 3.7 3.3 4.3
No. banks 709 548 56 105
Source: our calculations on BilBank data.
characterized by peer monitoring); (b) acceptance of new members is highly
discretionary, and this contributes to sustaining a homogeneous membership
(see, e.g., Angelini et al., 1998; Presti, 1998).
Other differences between the two types of co-operative banks and the stock
banks can be spotted by looking at the data. For instance, BCC are very
small compared both to POP and to SPA, either when considering total assets
(Table 2a) or when considering the number of employees (Table 3a); their small
dimensions emphasize their local nature. The balance sheet structure is also
different: BCC employ a lower share of total assets in loans and other earning
assets with respect to the other two types of banks, probably because of more
prudential managerial choices that, however, are not apparently reflected in the
proportion of bad loans (Table 2a).
A relevant difference concerns the composition of employment in the three
organizations: BCC have the highest share of executives and the lowest share of
officers; hence, the distance between the two extreme layers of the organization
seems to be reduced in BCC (Table 3a). A huge diversity is observed also for
profitability as measured by the ROE: the lowest performance is obtained by
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Table 3a. Descriptive statistics: personnel (mean values, 1999)
All BCC POP SPA
Employees (no.) 462 42 1, 065 1, 487
of which: executives (%) 3.1 3.7 2 1.8
of which: officers (%) 10.9 9.9 11.3 13.7
of which: other employees (%) 86.4 87.3 86.7 83.9
Personnel expenses (% Operating income) 39.4 40 37.9 38.1
Intermediated funds per employee (bn It. lire) 7.915 6.295 7.614 12.430
No. banks 709 495 39 175
Note: BCC = borrower-owned cooperative; POP = worker-owned cooperative; SPA = investor-owned
bank.
Source: our calculations on BilBank data.
Table 3b. Descriptive statistics: personnel (mean values, 1999)
Belonging to a group
All Independent Head Subsidiary
Employees (no.) 462 67 2,348 1,472
of which: executives (%) 3.1 3.6 1.9 1.5
of which: officers (%) 10.9 10.1 13.4 14
of which: other employees (%) 86.4 87.1 84.7 83.7
Personnel Expenses (% Operating income) 39.4 39.9 32.5 40.9
Intermediated funds per employee (bn It. lire) 7.915 6.378 22.051 8.054
No. banks 709 548 56 105
Source: our calculations on BilBank data.
BCC with 3.27%, whereas POP obtained 9.94% and SPA 8.07%. Again, this
seems to reinforce the idea that while BCC are still characterized by a mutualistic
structure, POP are not.
Estimation of the cost function in equation (4) requires the definition of the
input price vectorw = [wL,wK,wD] and the output vector y = [LO,OEA, SER].
Following the literature on banks’ efficiency, price of labour has been obtained
by dividing personnel expenses by the number of employees. As the structure
of employment is different among the three types of banks, I also computed
a weighted price of labour by assuming that executives’ compensation is three
times the basic compensation, and officers’ compensation is two times the basic
one. Price of physical capital is simply the ratio between administrative expenses
and the book value of fixed assets, while price of funds is the ratio between
total interest expenses and the volume of funds. Mean values for input prices are
collected in Table 4a: only narrow differences can be observed with respect to
input prices faced by the three types of banks; one exception is represented by
the higher price of physical capital for POP with respect to both BCC and SPA.
As far as the outputs are concerned, LO and OEA are represented respectively
by the total aggregate loans and the total aggregate securities, whereas SER are
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Table 4a. Descriptive statistics: input prices (mean values, 1999)
All BCC POP SPA
Labour (m. It. lire) 104 103 99 108
Labour weighted (∗) (m. It. lire) 89 88 86 91
Physical capital (m. It. lire) 1.132 1.092 1.736 1.112
Funds (%) 3.27 3.35 3.06 3.11
No. banks 709 495 39 175
Note: BCC = borrower-owned cooperative; POP = worker-owned cooperative; SPA = investor-owned
bank.
Labour = Personnel expenses/No. employees; Physical capital = administrative expenses/book value of
fixed assets; Funds = total interest expenses/volume of funds.
Source: our calculations on BilBank data. (∗) Considering the number of executives, officers and other
employees.
Table 4b. Descriptive statistics: input prices (mean values, 1999)
Belonging to a group
All Independent Head Subsidiary
Labour (m. It. lire) 104 103 117 104
Labour weighted (∗) (m. It. lire) 89 88 98 89
Physical capital (m. It. lire) 1.132 1.144 1.162 1.055
Funds (%) 3.27 3.28 3.51 3.09
No. banks 709 548 56 105
Note: Labour = Personnel expenses/No. employees; Physical capital = administrative expenses/book
value of fixed assets; Funds = total interest expenses/volume of funds.
Source: our calculations on BilBank data. (∗) Considering the number of executives, officers and other
employees.
proxied by the total aggregate securities managed for clients, an off-balance sheet
item that is directly related to the flow of services supplied to customers.
4. Results
I estimate the cost function in equation (4), and I derive individual cost efficiency
scores following the methodology introduced by Jondrow et al. (1982).8 These
cost efficiency scores are a proxy for the social transaction costs characterizing
8 Estimates of the two cost frontiers are included in the Appendix. Regularity conditions have been
checked following the approach by Salvanes and Tjøtta (1998). Marginal costs are positive for the vast
majority of the observations for both models. Moreover, the Hessian matrix with respect to input prices
is found to be negative semidefinite, again for both models, confirming the concavity in input prices of
the estimated cost frontiers. I also estimate these models on the two sub-samples of BCC and POP/SPA –
i.e. of small and large banks – and check the robustness of results to the composition of the sample by
computing the correlation between efficiency scores. Correlation coefficients suggest that results discussed
below are not biased by the sample composition. When re-estimating the models on the BCC sub-sample
only, I find correlation between the two efficiency scores series to be respectively 0.8857 and 0.9092
for Models 1 and 2 considered in the paper. Correlations are somewhat lower, but still very high, when
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Table 5a. Profitability, efficiency, scale and scope economies (mean values, 1999)
All BCC POP SPA
ROE (%) 4.83 3.27 (ˆ) 9.94 (ˆ) 8.07 (ˆ)
Efficiency mod. 1 (∗) 83.1 83.7 (ˆ) 84.1 (ˆ) 80.9 (ˆ)
Scale economies mod. 1 (∗) 1.13 1.15 (ˆ) 1.05 (ˆ) 1.08 (ˆ)
Scope economies (LO-OEA) mod. 1 (∗) 0.02 0.01 (ˆ) 0.05 (ˆ) 0.04 (ˆ)
Scope economies (LO-SER) mod. 1 (∗) 0.08 0.08 (ˆ) 0.06 (ˆ) 0.07 (ˆ)
Scope economies (SER-OEA) mod. 1 (∗) 0.003 0.002 (ˆ) 0.004 (ˆ) 0.005 (ˆ)
Efficiency mod. 2 (∗∗) 78.6 79.7 (ˆ) 79.2 (ˆ) 75.3 (ˆ)
Scale economies mod. 2 (∗∗) 1.15 1.16 (ˆ) 1.11 (ˆ) 1.11 (ˆ)
Scope economies (LO-OEA) mod. 2 (∗) 0.008 0.003 (ˆ) 0.02 (ˆ) 0.02 (ˆ)
Scope economies (LO-SER) mod. 2 (∗) 0.08 0.08 (ˆ) 0.05 (ˆ) 0.07 (ˆ)
Scope economies (SER-OEA) mod. 2 (∗) −0.001 −0.002 (ˆ) 0.0001 (ˆ) −0.0001 (ˆ)
No. banks 709 495 39 175
Notes: (∗) Using non-weighted price of labour.
(∗∗) Using weighted price of labour.
(ˆ) Indicates that group specific means (BCC, POP, SPA) are stat. diff. at the 5% lev. according to Kruskall-
Wallis test.
Bold typeface for values indicates significantly different from 1 and 0 (respect. for scale econ. and scope
econ.) at the 5% lev. (t-test).
LO = loans; OEA = other earning assets; SER = securities managed for clients.
Source: our calculations on BilBank data.
each organization. Mean values for the efficiency scores are collected in
Tables 5a–5c: model 1 considers the non-weighted price of labour, whilst
model 2 considers the weighted price of labour. The correlation between the two
set of estimates is 0.92; hence, results obtained from model 1 are in accordance
with those obtained frommodel 2. BCC and POP, the two types of co-operatives
banks operating in the Italian market, are more efficient than SPA (Table 5a).
As BCC are independent banks, this result is also reflected in the finding
that independent banks are more efficient than banks belonging to a group
(Table 5b).
However, since no clear theoretical results are available on the relative
ranking of the different ‘contracts’, the main prediction to be tested here is
that different incentives structures are characterized by different transaction
costs, i.e. by different levels of economic efficiency (hypothesis (a) above).
I test this prediction by simply checking whether group-specific means are
statistically different. Indeed, the Kruskall–Wallis test indicates that mean
efficiency scores are statistically different among SPA, POP, and BCC at the 5%
level of significance. Thence, different organizations seem to constitute different
incentives structures in the banking market.
An interesting point to be made is that these differences probably stem from
the ownership structure, which influences – for instance – the structure of
taking into account the SPA/POP sub-sample: correlation coefficients are respectively 0.7464 and 0.7020
in this case.
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Table 5b. Profitability, efficiency, scale and scope economies (mean values, 1999)
Belonging to a group
All Independent Head Subsidiary
ROE (%) 4.83 3.76 (ˆ) (§) 10.24 (#)(+) 7.31 (#) (+)
Efficiency mod. 1 (∗) 83.1 83.7 (ˆ) (§) 82.3 80.6
Scale economies mod. 1 (∗) 1.13 1.15 (ˆ) (§) 1.05 1.06
Scope economies (LO-OEA) mod. 1 (∗) 0.02 0.02 (ˆ) (§) 0.04 0.04
Scope economies (LO-SER) mod. 1 (∗) 0.08 0.08 (ˆ) (§) 0.08 0.09
Scope economies (SER-OEA) mod. 1 (∗) 0.003 0.002 (ˆ)(§) 0.005 0.006
Efficiency mod. 2 (∗∗) 78.6 79.6 (ˆ) (§) 76.6 74.6
Scale economies mod. 2 (∗∗) 1.15 1.16 (ˆ) (§) 1.09 1.09
Scope economies (LO-OEA) mod. 2 (∗) 0.008 0.005 (ˆ)(§) 0.02 0.01
Scope economies (LO-SER) mod. 2 (∗) 0.08 0.08 (ˆ) (§) 0.08 0.08
Scope economies (SER-OEA) mod. 2 (∗) −0.001 −0.002 −0.0006 0.0007
No. banks 709 548 56 105
Notes: (∗) Using non-weighted price of labour.
(∗∗) Using weighted price of labour.
(ˆ) Indicates that group specific means (INDEP., GROUP) are stat. diff. at the 5% lev. according to
Mann–Whitney test.
(§) Indicates that group specific means (INDEP., GROUP) are stat. diff. at the 5% lev. according to
Kolmogorov–Smirnoff test.
(#) Indicates that group specific means (HEAD, SUBS.) are stat. diff. at the 5% lev. according to Mann–
Whitney test.
(+) Indicates that group specific means (HEAD, SUBS.) are stat. diff. at the 5% lev. according to
Kolmogorov–Smirnoff test.
Bold typeface for values indicates significantly different from 1 and 0 (respect. for scale econ. and scope
econ.) at the 5% lev. (t-test).
LO = loans; OEA = other earning assets; SER = securities managed for clients.
Source: our calculations on BilBank data.
employment, and the size of the bank. From Table 5b, one can see that efficiency
score means are statistically different between independent banks and banks
belonging to a group, but differences are not statistically significant between head
and subsidiary banks. On the contrary, from Table 5c – that collects efficiency
scores for banks classified according to their size – group-specific means are
statistically different among all classes. Since relationship banking is related to
the size of the organization, it would be important to understand whether the
higher efficiency stems from the loan technology or is related to other factors
(on this point, see the recent contribution by Berger and Udell, 2006). Lacking
the relevant data, I do not explore this issue further here.
As expected, BCC are found to operate under increasing returns to scale in
both models, whereas POP and SPA can exploit only marginal economies of
scale; on the contrary, scope (dis)economies are very small for all the three types
of banks (Table 5a). As can be seen from Table 5c, economies of scale are clearly
related to banks’ size. By coupling this last result with efficiency scores, one is
then left with the conclusion that the efficiency gains from increasing bank’s size
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Table 5c. Profitability, efficiency, scale and scope economies (mean values, 1999)
Total assets (bln It. Lire)
> 104 > 258
All < 104 < 258 < 769 > 769
ROE (%) 4.83 −4.76 (ˆ) 7.4 (ˆ) 7.3 (ˆ) 9.4 (ˆ)
Efficiency mod. 1 (∗) 83.1 84.1 (ˆ) 84.1 (ˆ) 82.1 (ˆ) 81.9 (ˆ)
Scale economies mod. 1 (∗) 1.13 1.18 (ˆ) 1.15 (ˆ) 1.12 (ˆ) 1.05 (ˆ)
Scope economies (LO-OEA) mod. 1 (∗) 0.02 0.01 (ˆ) 0.02 (ˆ) 0.02 (ˆ) 0.04 (ˆ)
Scope economies (LO-SER) mod. 1 (∗) 0.08 0.07 (ˆ) 0.08 (ˆ) 0.09 (ˆ) 0.08 (ˆ)
Scope economies (SER-OEA) mod. 1 (∗) 0.003 0.001 (ˆ) 0.002 (ˆ) 0.003 (ˆ) 0.006 (ˆ)
Efficiency mod. 2 (∗∗) 78.6 79.6 (ˆ) 80.4 (ˆ) 77.7 (ˆ) 76.7 (ˆ)
Scale economies mod. 2 (∗∗) 1.15 1.17 (ˆ) 1.16 (ˆ) 1.14 (ˆ) 1.1 (ˆ)
Scope economies (LO-OEA) mod. 2 (∗) 0.008 0.007 (ˆ) 0.003 (ˆ) 0.006 (ˆ) 0.01 (ˆ)
Scope economies (LO-SER) mod. 2 (∗) 0.08 0.07 (ˆ) 0.08 (ˆ) 0.08 (ˆ) 0.08 (ˆ)
Scope economies (SER-OEA) mod. 2 (∗) −0.001 −0.001 (ˆ) −0.002 (ˆ) −0.002 (ˆ) 0.00003 (ˆ)
No. banks 709 176 179 177 177
Notes: (∗) Using non-weighted price of labour.
(∗∗) Using weighted price of labour.
(ˆ) Indicates that group specific means are stat. diff. at the 5% lev. according to Kruskall–Wallis test.
Bold typeface for values indicates significantly different from 1 and 0 (respect. for scale econ. and scope
econ.) at the 5% lev. (t-test).
LO = loans; OEA = other earning assets; SER = securities managed for clients.
Source: our calculations on BilBank data.
are lower than the efficiency losses stemming from the agency relationships in a
more layered organizational structure.
A second-stage analysis
The preceding analysis suffers from one main shortcoming: it does not take into
account that results may be driven by the correlation between organizational
structure and the size of banks. If smaller banks are the most efficient and
choose also to organize themselves as co-operative banks, then the fact that co-
operative institutions are more efficient may simply result from their size, and
does not reflect any organizational advantages. Indeed, differences in size are
often quoted when discussing banks’ heterogeneity. For instance, Dewatripont
and Tirole (1994) explicitly refer to the differences between small and large
banks, and not to differences in the organizational structures. These authors
also point out that large banks have a different asset composition, they are more
involved in off-balance sheet activities, they use more managed liabilities, and
they have lower interest margins. Notice that these are some of the differences
between co-operative banks and stock banks previously discussed in Section 3.2.
To test if there are pure organizational advantages stemming from the co-
operative contract, one needs to show that – controlling for size – co-operative
banks are more efficient than stock banks. To this aim, I then regress efficiency
scores obtained with the two models against a set of covariates, including both
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proxies for size and organizational dummies. In particular, given the nature of
the data (EFFi ≥ 0), I consider the following tobit model:
EFFi = X ′iβ + ui ; (8)
where the vector X includes controls for size, organizational structure, and
the quality of credit policies, and u is a N(0, σ 2) error term. Estimates of
model (8) are in Table 6. The emerging picture is fairly consistent across
all specifications, showing how efficiency correlates with variables in X .9
Coefficients on organizational dummies are always significant, suggesting that –
after controlling for a proxy for size – there are indeed differences related to
contracts in terms of social transaction costs. This confirms previous results
on the different roles played by the different contracts envisaged by the Civil
Code. Quite interesting findings emerge however also for size. First, when size is
proxied by the volume of total assets, I find a positive correlation with efficiency,
but that is statistically significant only for stock banks (only the coefficient
on the interaction term Log(Size) × SPA is positive and significant). Second,
when size is proxied by the number of employees, a negative correlation with
efficiency emerges, but that is statistically significant only for co-operative banks,
and marginally significant for stock banks. This differential impact of the two
proxies for size seems indeed to reinforce the interpretation of efficiency scores as
a measure of transaction costs: as for stock banks, the result emphasizes the role
of scale economies; as for co-operative banks, the finding points toward the role
of agency relationships within the organization. In the former case, the result
suggests that – given the choice of organizing the bank as a stock company –
efficiency gains can be obtained by increasing the volume of assets intermediated.
On the contrary, in the latter case – given the choice of organizing the bank as
a co-operative firm – efficiency gains can be obtained by limiting the number of
agency relationships within the organization. Finally, bad loans as a share of total
loans do have a significant negative correlation with efficiency scores, confirming
previous results in the literature that more frail banks, with poorer credit policies,
also are the less efficient institutions (e.g., Wheelock and Wilson, 1995).
5. Conclusions
The basic idea outlined by the theoretical literature on the firm as an incentive
structure is that the ownership of the firm – in the absence of specific provisions
by the law that limit the choice – should be efficiently assigned to the class of
stakeholders that minimizes the social transaction costs, i.e. the efficiency losses
9 Notice that we talk here about efficiency correlates, without assuming any causal relationship. As
discussed in Berger and Mester (1997), there are two main problems with this two-stage approach: first,
EFF is an estimate, so that a one-stage approach might be more appropriate; second, some variables (e.g.,
size) might be endogenous.
D
ifferent
contracts
in
the
civilcode
for
different
organizations
563
Table 6. Second-stage analysis: the determinants of efficiency
Size measured by TA Size measured by EMPL
LogEFF1 LogEFF2 LogEFF1 LogEFF2
BCC 4.440∗∗∗ 4.665∗∗∗ 4.222∗∗∗ 4.502∗∗∗ 4.571∗∗∗ 4.632∗∗∗ 4.553∗∗∗ 4.630∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.135) (0.109) (0.178) (0.026) (0.039) (0.034) (0.051)
SPA 4.349∗∗∗ 4.133∗∗∗ 4.042∗∗∗ 3.775∗∗∗ 4.553∗∗∗ 4.500∗∗∗ 4.501∗∗∗ 4.441∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.139) (0.134) (0.183) (0.044) (0.060) (0.059) (0.079)
POP 4.457∗∗∗ 4.563∗∗∗ 4.156∗∗∗ 4.282∗∗∗ 4.663∗∗∗ 4.523∗∗∗ 4.617∗∗∗ 4.406∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.307) (0.141) (0.405) (0.055) (0.130) (0.073) (0.172)
LogSIZE 0.004 0.019∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
LogSIZE × BCC −0.015 −0.004 −0.044∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015)
LogSIZE × SPA 0.019∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ −0.016∗ −0.021
(0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013)
LogSIZE × POP −0.003 0.010 −0.001 0.005
(0.021) (0.027) (0.021) (0.028)
LogBAD −0.072∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Sigma (a) 0.231∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 0.006 (0.008) (0.008)
No. obs. 695 695 695 695 695 695 695 695
Log-L 31.773 34.442 −160.653 −158.290 38.158 40.562 −157.165 −154.823
LM [df] (b) .000[5] .000[7] .000[5] .000[7] .000[5] .000[7] .000[5] .000[7]
Notes: (a) Estimated St.Dev. of disturbance term
(b) p-value and degrees of freedom of LM test for model
Note: BCC = borrower-owned cooperative; POP = worker-owned cooperative; SPA = investor-owned bank.
SIZE = total assets (TA) or number of employees (EMPL); BAD = bad loans/total loans
EFF1 = efficiency scores from Model 1 (unweighted price of labour); EFF2 = efficiency scores from Model 2 (weighted price of labour)
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stemming from the presence of contractual incompleteness. Social transaction
costs are defined as the sum of two components: the transaction costs stemming
from a contractual relation with the firm for all the stakeholders who are not
the owners, and the transaction costs arising within the firm for the class of
stakeholders who are the owners. The main prediction of this literature is that
different organizations (i.e., firms with different allocations of property rights)
are characterized by different levels of social transaction costs, hence by different
levels of economic inefficiency. Moreover, each organization plays a specific role
in the economy, so that the provision of different contracts by the law pursue an
efficiency aim.
In this paper, I propose a simple test of this prediction, focusing on the banking
industry, where different organizations co-exist together. I use data on the Italian
markets, where two types of co-operative banks – namely Banche Popolari and
Banche di Credito Cooperativo – supply banking services together with stock
banks. I estimate a standard translog cost frontier, with three inputs (labour,
physical capital, and deposits) and three outputs (loans, investments in other
earning assets, and the flow of services proxied by the volume of securities
managed for clients) common to the three types of banks, and I derive cost
efficiency scores. Kruskall–Wallis tests indicate that mean efficiency scores are
statistically different among the three types of banks, providing empirical support
to the theoretical prediction that different organizations represent different
incentive structures. Moreover, co-operatives banks appear to be more efficient
than stock banks. This result reflects a pure organizational advantage that is
robust also after controlling for a size effect and the quality of credit policies.
Hence, the efficiency gains stemming from the presence of scale economies seem
to be dominated by the efficiency losses caused by the agency relationships within
the bank in a more complex organization. From a theoretical point of view, a
possible explanation is based on the idea that borrower-owned co-operative
banks are an optimal incentive structure for a lending activity based on ‘soft’
information. However, whether relationship banking is the source of efficiency
or other factors are at work is an important point that deserves further scrutiny.
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Appendix: Stochastic frontiers estimates
Mod. 1 Mod. 2
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant −7.44∗∗∗ (1.09) −6.69∗∗∗ (1.43)
LO 1.11∗∗∗ (0.21) 1.15∗∗∗ (0.25)
OEA −0.29∗∗ (0.12) −0.36∗∗∗ (0.14)
SER 0.30∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.22∗∗∗ (0.08)
WL 1.65∗∗∗ (0.15) 1.29∗∗∗ (0.22)
WK −1.01∗∗∗ (0.11) −1.07∗∗∗ (0.13)
LO×LO 0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
OEA×OEA 0.01∗∗ (0.01) 0.002 (0.006)
SER×SER 0.02∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.02∗∗∗ (0.003)
LO×OEA −0.002 (0.007) 0.005 (0.008)
LO×SER −0.02∗∗∗ (0.003) −0.01∗∗∗ (0.003)
SER×OEA −0.002 (0.002) −0.001 (0.003)
WL×WK 0.0003 (0.01) 0.06∗∗∗ (0.02)
WL×WD −0.04 (0.03) −0.10∗∗∗ (0.03)
WK×WD −0.106∗∗∗ (0.01) −0.11∗∗∗ (0.02)
LO×WK 0.03∗∗ (0.01) 0.007 (0.01)
LO×WD 0.07∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.06∗∗ (0.02)
OEA×WK 0.02∗∗ (0.009) 0.03∗∗ (0.01)
OEA×WD −0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) −0.05∗∗∗ (0.01)
SER×WK 0.02∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.01∗∗ (0.007)
SER×WD 0.01∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.01 (0.009)
No. obs. 709 – 709 –
Lambda (§) 1.17∗∗∗ (0.107) 1.19∗∗∗ (0.096)
Sigma-sq. (v) 0.04 – 0.07 –
Sigma-sq. (u) 0.06 – 0.10 –
Model log-L −20.06 – −205.97 –
Adj. R-squared (#) 0.98 – 0.96 –
Notes: LO = loans; OEA = other earning assets; SER = securities managed for clients.
WL = price of labour; WK = price of physical capital; WD = price of funds.
Lev. of sign.: (∗) 10%, (∗∗) 5%, (∗∗∗) 1%.
(§) Std. Dev. (ineff.) / Std. Dev. (noise).
(#) R-squared from OLS estimates.
